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Antitrust  laws  generally  seek  to  promote  cised  or  not,  involves  power  to  control  the
competition  in  U.S.  markets.  Alternatively,  market and to set arbitrary and unreasonable
these  laws  attempt  to  correct  the  type  of  prices.
market  failure  that  occurs  when  the  market  Through  a  series  of  court  decisions,  agree-
does not sustain price competition or embodies  ments  among  competing  sellers  to  fix  prices
undesirable features,  such as prices fixed  and  were  deemed  illegal per se under Section 1 of
agreed upon by rival  sellers.  It is  well known  the Sherman Act. Overt price collusion thus is
that  the  federal  policy  to  curb  price-fixing  regarded  as a  criminal  conspiracy.  The  crimi-
agreements  was  central  to the  enactment  of  nalization  of  the  price-fixing  rule  in  effect
the Sherman Act of 1890. Formal cartels of the  means  that the law  punishes  attempts  to  fix
19th and early 20th centuries,  with their sales  prices.  The  economic  impact  of  the  actual
quotas,  exclusive  sales  agencies,  price-fixing  pricing decisions  of rival sellers in price-fixing
committees,  and  customer  and  geographic  conspiracies  is of no  significance  in determin-
sales allocations,  apparently have  been  elim-  ing guilt, even if the coconspirators  maximized
inated  from the  contemporary  scene.  Despite  losses instead of profits. This potential discrep-
the  disappearance  of  United  States  based  ancy between intent and completed  acts places
formal cartels, there has been considerable  liti-  preeminence  on  the legal conspiracy  doctrine
gation in recent years over pricing behavior of  rather  than  the  economist's  price  theory.
individual  firms.  A wide  array  of agricultural  According  to Posner, this situation is unfortu-
and food industries have been involved in these  nate because many attempts to fix prices may
actions.  have negligible economic consequences, where-
The purposes of this article are (1) to describe  as  serious  price  fixing  may escape  the  detec-
the  current  status  of federal  price-fixing  liti-  tion of overt communication [16, p. 41].
gation in the United States with particular re-  Realities,  of  course,  must  dominate  the
ference to food firms and industries,  (2) to dis-  determination  of whether or not a certain rela-
cuss  economic  issues  involved  in price-fixing  tionship  is objectionable.  The  mere  fact  that
litigation, and (3) to relate legal implications of  the parties to an agreement eliminate competi-
competition and antitrust actions.  tion between themselves  is not enough to con-
demn it  [1].  In grey areas the Supreme Court
has applied the "rule of reason" instead of the
PRICE-FIXING  DEFINED  per se rule [3].
The term "price fixing" is meant to refer pri-
marily to price agreements among rival sellers.  INCIDENCE  OF  PRICE-FIXING
Depending on the nature of a particular  case,  LITIGATION
litigation involving rigged  prices,  exchange of
price  information,  and/or  price  discrimination  Price-fixing  actions  are  filed  under  the
also may be closely related to "price fixing."  authority  of several  federal  statutes,  but pri-
The  aim  and  result  of  every  price-fixing  marily  the  Sherman  Act,  the  Federal  Trade
agreement,  if it is  effective,  is the elimination  Commission  (FTC) Act,  and the Clayton Act.
of  one  form  or  another  of  competition.  The  Under  the  Sherman  Act,  the  U.S.  Attorney
power  to  fix prices,  whether  reasonably  exer-  General may bring either civil or criminal suits
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1or both simultaneously.  Section  5  of the FTC  cases in federal courts  in the period 1935-1974
Act gives  the Commission  adequate  power to  [6,  p. 35],  1,723  U.S. Department of Justice ac-
conduct investigations,  issue complaints,  hold  tions for the 1890-1974  period  [16,  p.  25],  and
hearings,  and enter cease and desist orders  in  approximately  5,000  class  actions pending  in
cases  of  proved violations.  The  FTC also  ad-  federal courts in 1976  [11, p. 11].
ministers the provisions  of the  Robinson-Pat-  Because  most price-fixing  cases  are  settled
man  Act,  which  amended  Section  2  of  the  out of court or never reach the appellate  court
Clayton Act in 1936 as pertaining to price dis-  level,  the actual number of such cases  involv-
crimination.  ing  food  firms  is  not  readily  known  for  the
Price-fixing litigation may arise from actions  United States at any particular point in time.
initiated  by  the  Antitrust  Division  of  the  Careful review  of CCH Trade Cases was  made
Justice  Department,  Federal  Trade  Commis-  for  the  1967-1977  period  to  estimate  the
sion,  or from private  persons,  including state  number of price-fixing and price discrimination
governments  and municipalities.'  The  volume  cases adjudicated at the federal appellate court
of cases filed is related strongly to the level of  level. 2 This review greatly underestimates  the
government  enforcement  activity.  Successful  number of cases,  but it  does  suggest  the  inci-
criminal prosecution in price-fixing cases often  dence  of  food  cases  in  relation  to  nonfood
is  followed  by  private  actions  involving  the  cases, as well as the significance  of food price-
same  defendants.  Enforcement  activity  ebbs  fixing litigation  in relation  to total food anti-
and flows over time in relation to attitudes of  trust  cases.  For  the  1966-1977  period,  there
the political  leadership,  agency officials,  con-  were 56 food price-fixing cases and 44 price dis-
sumer  advocates,  and  the  antitrust  bar.  The  crimination cases which involved appellate  ac-
incidence  of  legal  action  may  not  correlate  tions  filed  by  the  U.S.  Justice  Department,
closely to actual occurrence of price fixing.  private  parties,  and  FTC  cease  and  desist
Estimates  of the  total number  of  antitrust  orders. Seven cases dealt with both price fixing
suits  of  various  types  can  be  found  in  the  and  price  discrimination.3 Food  price-fixing
source  materials:  8,427  private  antitrust  cases  represented  roughly  20  percent  of  all
TABLE 1.  CCH TRADE CASES, 1967-1977
Both  Price
Food  Price  Fixing  and  Food  as  %  Price  Fixing  Price  Discrimina-
Total  Cases  Price  Discrimina-  Price  of  Total  as  %  of  Total  tion  as  %  of
Year  Cases  Total  Fixing  tion  Discrimination  Cases  Food  Cases  Total  Food  Cases
1967  632  23  6  8  0  3.6  26.1  34.8
1968  343  26  7  7  1  7.6  26.9  26.9
1969  315  18  3  5  0  5.7  16.7  27.8
1970  404  23  4  2  1  5.7  17.4  8.7
1971  389  19  3  2  1  4.9  15.8  10.5
1972  477  20  3  2  1  4.2  15.0  10.0
1973  600  38  6  4  1  6.3  15.8  10.5
1974  585  44  12  4  1  7.5  27.2  9.1
1975  577  41  5  5  0  7.1  12.2  12.2
1976  534  42  6  4  0  7.9  14.3  9.5
1 9 77a  303  21  1  1  0  6.9  4.8  4.8
Total  5159  315  56  44  6  6.13  17.8  14.0
aOnly the first six months of 1977
Source:  Compiled from CCH Trade Cases, Chicago:  Commerce Clearing House, various issues,  1967-1977
'The U.S. Secretary  of Agriculture also has the authority to deal with price fixing by cooperatives  under the Capper-Volstead  Act and  by meat packers  under
the Packers and Stockyards Act.  The regulatory activities of the Secretary of Agriculture under these statutes are not reviewed here.
2
The CCH Trade Cases reporter does  not include cease and desist orders  made directly through  the Federal  Trade Commission's own administrative proceed-
ings which were  obeyed and not appealed.
'In many instances a given "case" represented  several similar actions for a particular commodity  or type of firm. Thus, the number of cases reported  here even
underestimates the number of appellate actions.
2food  antitrust  cases.  Food  cases  surprisingly  In  the  foregoing  discussion  of  the  food
represented  only  6 percent of all actions cited  industry, the cases cited are readily discernible
in  the  1966-1977  period.  The  average  rate  of  from  published  sources.  The  actual  total
food cases for the  1973-1977  period was twice  number  of  food  industry  price-fixing  actions
the rate for the 1967-1972 period (Table 1).  filed  is likely  to have  been  several  times  the
The  56  price-fixing  cases  were  divided  level reported. As an illustration,  of the 7,500
equally  between  private  and  government  ac-  private antitrust actions filed in the 1963-1972
tions in the  1967-1977  period.  However,  since  period, more than 70 percent were settled even
1975,  two-thirds  of the actions have  been pri-  before the pretrial process [5, p. 141].
vate suits.  Private actions are relatively  more
important in price discrimination  cases  - ap-  NATURE  OF  PRICE-FIXING  SUITS
proximately  three-fourths  of  the  total  in  the  IN TE  FOOD  INDUSTRY
1967-1977 period. All appellate cases involving
both price fixing and price discrimination were  Though  there  are  many  variations  of  the
legal  actions  between  private  parties.  Since  main  complaint,  plaintiffs  in food price-fixing
1975,  all  but one price  discrimination  suit  in-  suits  commonly  charge  that  the  defendants
volved private parties.  and coconspirators  are engaged  in a  combina-
The relative  increase  in private  rather than  tion  and conspiracy  in unreasonable  restraint
government  actions in  recent  years is  due  to  of interstate  trade and commerce  in violation
the  proliferation  of class  action  suits  having  of Section  1 of the Sherman Act.  This charge
the  potential  reward  of  treble  damages.  usually is followed by somewhat more specific
Private treble damage suits require proof of an  charges  that  the  defendants  and  coconspira-
antitrust violation by the defendant, proof that  tors fixed and/or raised prices, exchanged price
the plaintiff has been  damaged  as a result  of  information,  submitted  rigged  bids,  or  con-
the  violation,  and  proof  of  the  extent  of  the  spired to maintain and stabilize list prices.  In
damages.  addition to price-fixing charges, the cases often
In terms  of the  type  of food  products,  one  include  allegations  that defendants  allocated
half  of the  price-fixing  cases  involved  dairy  territories,  boycotted  or  refused  to  sell
and  bakery  products.  Other  major  industry  restricted  resale,  participated  in  trade
groups  for  price-fixing  litigation  have  been  associations whose practices are in violation of
meat products and beer (Table 2).  the antitrust  law,  rotated  customers,  limited
TABLE  2.  NUMBER  OF  CITED  FOOD-  supplies,  and/or  perpetuated  illegal  tie-in  ar-
PRICE  FIXING/DISCRIMINA-  rangements.  Though the Sherman  Act  is the
TION  CASES  BY  TYPE  OF  dominant statute cited, food price-fixing cases
PRODUCT,  1967-1977  also involve  the Clayton  Act,  and to a lesser
degree the Robinson-Patman  and the  Capper-
Pri  Both Price  Fix-  Volstead Acts. Price  ing  and Price
Products  Fixing  Discrimination  Discrimination  Total  Government  actions  tend to  concentrate on
Dairy  Products  14  18  O  32  the  food  manufacturing  sector  rather  than
Bread &  Bakery  growers, wholesalers,  or  food retailers.  In pri-
Beer  4  3  4  11 Beer ou  4  3  4  11  vate  price-fixing  litigation,  most  of  the legal
Fruits  and  Vegetables  3  3  0  6  action is between two or more vertical compon-
Meat Products  5  1  O  6  ents of the food marketing chain. That is, farm
Soft  Drinks  2  2  0  4
Groceries  0  3  o  3  producers  (or  their  organizations)  take  legal
Snack  Foods  3  o  o  3  action against processors and/or retailers, food
Sugar  2  . 1  3  processors  file  action  against  food  retailers,
Pouy Produts  1  1  2  food wholesalers allege price fixing among food
Vending  Products  1  0  2  processors,  food  retailers  complain  (legally)
Wine  0  2  o  2  about  price  fixing  by  cooperative  producer
Donut Franchise  0  1  0  1
Chicken  Franchise  o  l  1  associations,  consumer/user groups take action Chicken  Franchise  D  D  1
Coffee  1  0  0  1  against  basic  food  manufacturers,  ad
Fish  O  1  o  1  infinitum.  Thus,  the causes  of action  in  food
nFlour  1  0  1  price-fixing cases tend to flow either vertically Frozen  Pies  0  1  0  1
Fruit  Spread  O  1  0  1  upward  or  backward  within  the  marketing
Ice  Cream  Franchise  1  0  1  system. Occasionally the action takes place on
Macaroni  D  1  D  1  a horizontal  plane between  two or  more firms
7-11  Franchise  1  O  o  1  engaged  in the same function,  such as among
56  44  7  107  frozen  pie makers.  Litigation  among  horizon-
Source:  Compiled from CCH Trade Cases, Chicago:  Com-  tally  competing  firms,  however,  usually
merce Clearing House various issues, 1967-1977  emphasized  price  discrimination  rather  than
3price-fixing issues.  refined sugar prices were determined  competi-
Price-fixing litigation in the food industry is  tively  and  that  the  economic  facts  did  not
best illustrated by the sugar [8], beef [8,  10, 12],  support  the  plaintiffs'  allegations  that  price
milk [9, 20], bread [19], and broiler cases [2, 21].  changes  were  the  result  of  conspiratorial
The reader is referred to [15] for brief summar-  activity  among  the  codefendants  [14].  This
ies of these cases.  case was settled on the basis that the codefen-
dants  did not  violate  any  antitrust  laws  and
that they did not  cause damages to the plain-
SOME  ECONOMIC  ISSUES  tiffs and their classes. The defendants paid $25
million to the  settling  plaintiffs,  however,  as
Economic  theory does  not provide  a totally  insurance against  the unpredictable  nature of
adequate basis for predicting price  fixing and  this massive and complex litigation. For com-
other forms of collusive behavior.  By combin-  petitive  food and  agricultural  industries with
ing  it  with  industrial  organization  analysis,  generally  low  profit  rates,  the  "nuisance"
however, the economist does have a reasonable  value of antitrust settlements may seem exor-
means of detecting tacit collusion.  Such struc-  bitant.
tural characteristics  as high  seller  concentra-
tion,  the absence  of  a fringe  of small  sellers,  In the Utah Pie case three national frozen pie
severe entry barriers,  a standardized or homo-  makers had engaged in price discrimination  in
geneous product, similar vertical marketing ar-  both  a  legal  and  aneconomic  sense.For
rangements among competing sellers, static or  example, one national firm sold pies for $4 per
declining demand,  and/or a high ratio of fixed  dozen in Alhabra, California,  but only  $2.74
to variable costs can be partial signals of mis-  per  dozen  in  Ogden,  Utah  even  though  the
conduct. These factors do not either individual-  manufacturing  plant was closer  to Alhambra.
ly or jointly provide  a  definite basis  for  con-  The  price  discounting  that  occurred  was
cluding that price-fixing exists, however.  usually  off-list. After a series of court battles,
Economists  and  lawyers  representing  anti-  the Supreme  Court  found  evidence  of  preda-
trust  enforcement  agencies  and  plaintiffs  at-  tory intent by each of the three  national com-
tempt  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  price  panies  and  that the declining  price  structure
fixing with specific kinds of economic evidence.  for frozen  pies  in Utah was  evidence  of price
"Proof"  of  implicit  collusion  involves  the  discrimination  which  had the requisite injury
demonstration  of one or more of the following  to  competition  [4].  Elzinga  and Hogarty  con-
factors:  fixed  relative  market  shares,  price  ducted an econometric  analysis  of the  court's
discrimination,  exchanges  of  price  decision  on  pie  prices.  They  concluded  that
information,  identical  bids,  price-quantity  there  was  very little immediate  effect  on  the
changes  unexplained  by  variations  in  cost  price  of  frozen  fruit  pies.  More  importantly,
industrywide  resale  price  maintenance,  the  they  found the Robinson-Patman  Act had the
level and pattern  of profits,  and basing point  effect  of aering the identity of players  in the
pricing.  Though  these  factors  may  raise  the  market. Though the national pie companies re-
question of price collusion,  they do not provide  duced their presence  in the Utah market after
inviolate "proof."  their  unsuccessful  court  battles,  the  local
family-operated  Utah Pie  Company went  out
Because  of  improved  offensive  economic  of business despite a favorable  court decision.
tools and the increasing likelihood  of antitrust  The  protection  from  competition  under  the
litigation,  otherwise  competitive  agricultural  Robinson-Patman  Act  is  thus  marginal  and
and food industries need expert  legal and eco-  exaggerated by the Act's critics. According to
nomic  assistance  to protect  themselves  from  Elzinga and Hogarty, price discrimination can
arbitrary  actions and nuisance  suits.  Agricul-  signal  a  breakdown  in  market  power  and  a
tural  economists  can  assist  the  defendants'  movement  toward  a  competitive  equilibrium
antitrust  bar  by  describing  the  competitive  and  not  necessarily  the  exploitation  of  a
nature  of the particular market under attack.  monopoly position [6, p. 38].
In one  set of the  sugar price-fixing  cases  in-  Of considerable  importance  to  agricultural
volving  three  sugar  companies  defending  marketing  economists  is  the recent  Supreme
themselves  against  more  than  100  industrial  Court  decision  involving  the  Illinois  Brick
sugar  users,  the  defense  was  built  largely  Company  [7].  In this case  the State  of Illinois
around the market forces affecting supply and  and 700 local government entities charged that
demand  for  the  historical  period.  A  detailed  concrete block manufacturers  had engaged in a
analysis of the various and competitive factors  price-fixing conspiracy in violation of Section 1
of the market was provided in the context of in-  of the Sherman Act. Because  block manufact-
stitutional  restraints  and  government  con-  urers  sell  their products  directly  to masonry
trols.  The Polopolus  affidavit  concluded  that  contractors,  who in turn sell blocks to general
4contractors,  state  governmental  agencies  are  attorneys',  and consultants'  fees,  court  costs,
indirect  purchasers.  The  Supreme  Court  held  computer  data  services,  and  the time  and re-
that purchasers cannot sue alleged price-fixers  sources  of  company  employees  and  officers,
unless  they  deal  directly  with  them.  One  not to mention the millions  of dollars in out of
immediate  effect  of the Illinois Brick  decision  court settlements.  In one relatively  small case,
is to limit consumer class action suits to retail  Utah Pie, Elzinga  and Hogarty estimated  the
price  fixing,  which traditionally  has not  been  legal defense costs to be about $1  million which
the dominant part of price-fixing  cases. There  represented  the value of 3 million frozen  fruit
is evidence that in the class action broiler cases  pies  [6,  p. 34].  They estimated the total direct
the plaintiffs' attorneys narrowed their classes  cost  of  complying  with  and  litigating  the
of litigants to direct purchasers of chickens  [2].  Robinson-Patman Act to be $1.4 billion for the
If price fixing occurs at one stage of a compli-  1936-1974 period, with food cases representing
cated  agricultural  marketing system,  it is  ex-  more than one half of the total [6, p. 35-36].
tremely difficult  to estimate the impact  of the  This is not to say that antitrust enforcement
violation  on  prices  in  all  subsequent  stages,  has not deterred misconduct among competing
particularly  if  a  raw  agricultural  product  is  sellers.  In  several  classic  examples  of  price-
used  in  several  different  processed  products  fixing conspiracies,  judicial  action resulted  in
and sold  in disparate  markets.  Even in fairly  lower consumer prices.  In the  1965 bread case
simple vertical marketing systems, it would be  in the state of Washington,  several bakers and
difficult to estimate how much injury occurred  the largest food chain were found guilty of sur-
at each stage of the marketing and distribution  pressing  price  competition  and  maintaining
system.  Though  Congress  has  not  yet  taken  uniform and noncompetitive prices. During the
action on this issue,  there  is some speculation  conspiracy period,  bread prices in Washington
that antitrust  laws will be amended explicitly  averaged  20  percent  above  the U.S.  average,
to permit recovery by indirect purchasers.  whereas before the conspiracy  prices had been
about  equal  to  the  U.S.  average.  After  the
COST  AND  BENEFITS  OF  violation  was  determined,  bread  prices
ENFORCEMENT  dropped  below  the national  average.  Mueller
estimated  that  the  conspiracy  "cost"
The  number  of antitrust  class  action  suits  Washington consumers  $35 million [13,  p. 87].
which  are  settled  out  of  court  raises  serious  The costs of litigation and  enforcement,  how-
questions  about  the  efficiency  of  antitrust  ever,  need  to  be  substracted  before  a  final policies  and  enforcement  procedures.  The  societal judgment  of  the  bread  cases  can  be
general  policy,  of  course,  is  to  protect  the  made. In  a  few  instances  farmers  and  fishermen consumer  from  business  conduct  which  re-  In a  few  instances  farmes  and  fishermen
duces  social  welfare.  Curbing  antitrust  viola-  have attempted to redress alleged inequities in
tions and otherwise promoting perfect compe-  the  marketing  system  by  class  action  suits
tition does involve  enforcement  and litigation  against food handlers and processors.  Prochas-
costs which are not insignificant.  ka,  for  example,  conducted  an  interesting
The  opportunity  for  treble  damages  in  empirical analysis  of the impact on prices and
private  antitrust  litigation,  particularly,  marketing  margins  of  litigation  brought  by
creates perverse incentives  and may not be in  king  mackeral  fishermen  and  the  subsequent
the public interest.  The perversity results from  formation of a marketing cooperative [17].
the possibility that injured firms may not seek
lower  prices,  but  sustain  $1  of  "wrong"  in  THE  ATTORNEY'S  ROLE  IN
anticipation of $3 of recovery from legal action.  ANTITRUST  ACTIONS
Also, private treble damages encourage certain
firms  to  allege  vaguely  anticompetitive  As  the  economists'  role  in  antitrust  cases
behavior-which  in  fact  did  not  occur-in  has changed over time, so has there been some
hopes  of  an out  of  court  settlement.  Even  in  rethinking by the legal profession in relation to
nuisance"  price-fixing  suits,  defendants  will  antitrust  cases.  The lawyer,  working within  a
pay  off  some  money  rather  than  risk  a  jury  framework of precedents,  adheres to the estab- trial.  Obviously,  consumer welfare  is  reduced  lished legal norms  which  are not always  com-
in these situations as the costs associated with  prehensible  to economists.  Although  he,  too,
these activities are ultimately tacked onto con-  deals with abstractions rather than certainties,
sumer prices.  the attorney  has been very reluctant  to allow
Litigation  costs and  the  value  of company  models  developed  by  the  economist  to time expended in defending antitrust cases can  influence his approach to legal antitrust issues.
be  awesome  in  the  food  industry.  The  sugar  By using rigid  Socratic  dialogue  developed
cases  involved  millions  of  dollars  for  through  rigorous  cross-examination,  the anti-
5trust  lawyer  tests the validity  of  the models  lished  best  when  economists  and  attorneys
constructed  by  the  economist  to  solve  understand  each  other's  discipline,  including
problems.  Because any legal issue presupposes  inherent limitations and assumptions.
a  basic  adversary  action,  opposing  attorneys
using  like  techniques,  mainly  cross-examina-  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
tion, attempt  to sort  out  inconsistencies  and
half-truths according to the basic issue.  Agricultural  economists  have  an important
The Socratic technique, though working well  role to play in price-fixing  and other antitrust
with individuals  or even  groups,  leaves much  matters  involving  the  food  and  agribusiness
to be desired in analyzing the economic truism  industries. This  role is augmented by the pro-
of  antitrust  legislation,  particularly  such  fessional  need  to  determine  the  nature  and
vague terminology as contained in Section 1 of  degree of competition  in agricultural  and food
the  Sherman  Act  and other  subsequent  anti-  markets  and  to  assess  the  causes  of  market
trust legislation. The economist may resent the  imperfections.  If  price  fixing  is proved  for  a
intrusion of the legal adversary technique.  Be-  particular market,  the agricultural  economist
cause the economist  knows little of the opera-  has  adequate  tools  to  estimate  what  would
tion of legal instrumentalities or their ultimate  have  been  competitive  prices  under  normal
objective,  he may feel greatly frustrated if his  market conditions.
contribution  to  the  solution  of  the  antitrust  The overall  atmosphere of antitrust policies
problem  is not given full weight.  The lawyer,  and enforcement is confusing. The basis philos-
though he may have less knowledge of the eco-  ophy  of  promoting  competition  has  obvious
nomic  ramifications  of antitrust  policy under  benefits  to  society.  Elzinga  and  Breit  argue
the  present  legal  system,  does  not  surrender  that efficient  antitrust  enforcement  requires
easily to the economist.  the replacement  of the present  reparations-in-
Intercommunication  between the disciplines  duced private action system by public enforce-
of agricultural  economics and law has become  ment with optimal fines [5, p. 139]. This conclu-
increasingly  important  in  antitrust  matters.  sion is based on  the high degree  of risk aver-
Interchange  of information about  the relative  sion among corporate  managers. That is, large
realities  of  each  discipline  allows  a  basic  ac-  financial  penalties will be more likely  to deter
commodation  to  be  reached  whereby  both  price fixing than stepped-up enforcement prac-
groups  can  contribute  their  expertise  to  tices.  Jail  sentences,  injunctive relief  (dissolu-
solving  the  very  vexatious  and  troublesome  tion,  divorcement,  and  divestiture),  and
problems  in  the  field  of  antitrust  legislation  private treble damages are deemed inadequate.
and enforcement.  Kirkham complains that the rules of discov-
The tools of discovery available to both liti-  ery have  been  perverted  to permit "fumbling
gants  are  interrogatories  and  depositions.  about in an effort to discover a cause of action"
These devices enable the adversary lawyers to  [11, p. 10]. He further contends that the courts
establish the issues by identifying unresolved  have extended  the scope of discovery and the
facts  as  well  as  other  controverted  matters.  possible  scope of the trial to "any period the
They also ensure the stability and truthfulness  plaintiff  wishes  to  name--10,  20,  30  years-
of the affiant. Ultimately they have much to do  dredging up transactions so remote that differ-
with  the  determination  of  both  criminal  and  ent principles of law might then have been ap-
civil penalties  and  liabilities  imposed  by  the  plicable" [11, p. 10]. We have already discussed
courts after the issues have  been resolved  for  the  possible  perverse  incentives  from  treble
an  individual  antitrust  case  or  consolidated  damage actions and have implied that the pro-
group of antitrust cases. Because in some cases  liferation  of class action suits has been a chief
treble  damages  can  be  exacted,  the  proofs  contributor to court congestion.
elicited  through  interrogatories,  depositions,  In the years ahead, federal antitrust agencies
and affidavits are most important.  are likely to become increasingly  suspicious of
The economist has an increasingly important  the  pricing  behavior  of  farmer  cooperatives
role  as  an  "expert  witness"  in  antitrust  and the pricing effects of marketing orders and
actions,  both public and  private.  He  must be  agreements.  Given the already substantial and
able to translate his findings to the antitrust  diverse nature of antitrust activity in food and
lawyer who then can use them intelligently in  agricultural industries,  the future  demand for
the  adversary  proceedings  for  solving  anti-  expert  public  and private  services  of agricul-
trust issues. This cooperation  can be accomp-  tural economists and attorneys is assured.
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